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Abstract:   
Reference models of the earth’s interior play an important role in the acquisition of 
knowledge about the earth’s interior and the earth as a whole.  Such models are used 
as a sort of standard reference against which data are compared.  I argue that the use 
of reference models merits more attention than it has gotten so far in the literature on 
models, for it is an example of a method of doing science that has a long and 
significant history, and a study of reference models could increase our understanding 
of this methodology. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Reference models of the earth’s interior play an important role in the 
acquisition of knowledge about the earth’s interior and the earth as a whole.  Such 
models are used as a sort of standard reference against which data are compared.  
Deviations between the observations one would expect if the reference model were an 
accurate representation of the earth, and actual observations, are used to make 
inferences about the earth’s interior.  Perhaps the most widely used such model in 
geophysics, the Preliminary Reference Earth Model or PREM2 (Dziewonski and 
Anderson 1981), was completed in 1981, and it has been utilized for the construction 
of many other models through the end of the century (Ritzwoller and Lavely 1995).   
There is a recent, growing literature focusing on the use of models in science 
(e.g. Morgan and Morrison 1999, Wimsatt 2007, Weisberg 2013).  The use of models 
in a manner similar to the way in which reference models are used in geophysics is 
described by Wimsatt (2007), but he mentions these uses merely in passing in his 	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2 See Smith 2007 for an account of the history of seismology leading up to the 
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discussion of neutral models in biology.  Weisberg (2013) has a much more 
comprehensive and systematic account of models and their uses in science, but he 
does not specifically mention a use of models in the manner I will describe in this 
paper.  I will argue that the use of reference models merits more attention than it has 
gotten so far in the literature on models, for it is an example of a method of doing 
science that has a long and significant history, one which has recently been described 
by Smith (2002) and Harper (2011) as “turning theory into evidence”, and a study of 
reference models could increase our understanding of this methodology.   
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on models by first 
locating reference models relative to the general taxonomy of models described by 
Weisberg, and comparing them to the use of neutral models in biology as described 
by Wimsatt.  I will then examine some possible desiderata for the construction of 
reference models, and then end the paper with some considerations about the 
connection between reference models and “turning theory into evidence”.   
 
2.  Models and Idealization 
I will start with Weisberg’s picture of models because it is the most ambitious 
recent attempt to give a comprehensive account of models and their use in science, 
and it appears likely itself to become a standard reference on models for philosophers 
of science.  From the standpoint of Weisberg’s picture, Earth reference models would 
best be construed as target-directed models that utilize Galilean idealization 
(Weisberg 2013, 74-112).  Target-directed models are models for which the modeler 
has a specific target in mind.  For earth reference models, the target is clearly the 
interior of the earth.  In Weisberg’s picture of models, there are three different ways 
in which models can be idealized: Galilean idealization, minimalist idealization, and 
multiple-models idealization.  Galilean idealization involves the simplification of 
models with the aim of making them more mathematically tractable.  Minimalist 
idealization involves the construction of models that include only difference-making 
factors that are necessary for a phenomenon, with the aim of constructing an 
explanation of a given phenomenon.  Multiple-models idealization involves building 
multiple incompatible models of a single phenomenon, usually in the study of highly 
complex phenomena.    
As we shall see, earth reference models involve Galilean idealization, so I 
want to examine this notion in more depth.  Weisberg’s discussion of Galilean 
idealization (2013, 99) depends heavily on the description given in McMullin (1985).  
Typically, there is some phenomenon of interest, but it is too complicated to model 
faithfully, so an initial simplified model is created.  Then, this simplified model is 
used to improve our understanding of the phenomenon, and the simplified model is 
gradually made more realistic in a process that McMullin calls “de-idealization”.  
Weisberg takes the whole purpose of Galilean idealization to be to deal with 
intractability, and thus “advances in computational power and mathematical 
techniques should lead the Galilean idealizer to de-idealize” (99).   
Weisberg does not give very detailed examples of this process of de-
idealization, but McMullin does.3  The most detailed example he gives is the Bohr 
model of the hydrogen atom (McMullin 1985, 260-261).  The Bohr model, in which 
the electron is in a circular orbit around the proton, could be used to predict the 
energy levels of the electron, which could then be compared to spectroscopic 
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observations of hydrogen.  More specifically, a theoretical value for the Rydberg 
constant could be calculated, which could then be compared to empirical 
measurements of this constant.  McMullin says that at least three idealizations were 
being made here: the neutron is at rest, the orbit of the electron is circular, and 
relativistic effects are left out.  Later on, successive corrections were made to the 
model which, McMullin claims, resulted in a closer fit between the model and reality.  
McMullin describes this process as one where the model “serves as the basis for a 
continuing research program”, one in which the model starts off as a tractable model 
that has significant departures from reality, and this model is gradually filled in with 
more and more details.   
Here, I want to ask exactly how the initial model serves as a basis for this 
research program.  There are two significantly different ways in which it could do 
that.  The first way is for the model simply to provide a sort of skeleton upon which 
further and further new details are added.  These details might come about through 
new observations, or through the development of new mathematical or computational 
techniques that overcome the intractability problems that led to the development of 
the initial simplified model, allowing such details to be filled in, where previously 
they could not.  The second way is for the model itself to be used directly to produce 
the new observations from which the further details can be added.  I will call the first 
kind of process passive de-idealization, while I will call the second kind active de-
idealization.  We will see that earth reference models are used for active de-
idealization.   
Exactly how does active de-idealization work?  Although Wimsatt (2007) 
does not use my terminology, he describes an example of active de-idealization.  One 
of the major points that Wimsatt makes is that false models can be used in many 
different ways to learn true facts about complicated systems.  He gives a list of twelve 
ways in which false models can be used to search for better models.  I want to focus 
here on the first five such functions he gives for false models:   
 
1. An oversimplified model may act as a starting point in a series of models 
of increasing complexity and realism.   
2. A known incorrect but otherwise suggestive model may undercut the too 
ready acceptance of a preferred hypothesis by suggesting new alternative 
lines for the explanation of the phenomena.   
3. An incorrect model may suggest new predictive tests or new refinements 
of an established model, or highlight specific features of it as particularly 
important.   
4. An incomplete model may be used as a template, which captures larger or 
otherwise more obvious effects that can then be “factored out” to detect 
phenomena that would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen.   
5. A model that is incomplete may be used as a template for estimating the 
magnitudes of parameters that are not included in the model.   
(Wimsatt 2007, 104) 
 
The first function is, of course, mentioned by both Weisberg and McMullin.  It is a 
statement of the idea of Galilean idealization and the process of gradual de-
idealization.  In functions 2 and 3, a false model is used as a heuristic—it suggests 
“new alternative lines for the explanation of phenomena”, or “new predictive tests or 
new refinements”.  I want to focus particularly on functions 4 and 5.  When used for 
these functions, Wimsatt says that the false model is used as a “template” that is used 
to either factor out larger effects in order to capture effects that are too small to be 
seen, or for estimating parameters that are not themselves included in the model.   
The discussion in Wimsatt (2007) involves a detailed study of the linear 
linkage model developed by Thomas Hunt Morgan in the early twentieth century.  
Wimsatt gives several examples of cases where deviations from the predictions of the 
linear linkage model were used to postulate causal factors that were not being taken 
into account in the model.  This use of the model would fall under function 4 
(Wimsatt 2007, 106-111).  He also discusses a case where deviations from the 
predictions of another model, the Haldane mapping function, is used to estimate the 
value of a parameter that is not contained in the model itself (Wimsatt 2007, 120).   
 I want to emphasize again that functions 4 and 5 for models as described by 
Wimsatt is active, not passive, de-idealization.  The false model is used directly to 
produce evidence that can then be used to extract information about the system or 
phenomenon of interest.  It is not being used merely as a heuristic—rather, the model 
itself is used to produce the observations.  Wimsatt provides a very good example of 
these uses of false models, but one might get the impression that the way in which 
models are used here is relatively rare in science.  This impression, however, is 
mistaken—there are at least some sciences where this is the primary way in which 
progress is made.  Most of our knowledge of the interior of the earth, for example, is 
the result of the application of this method.   
 Perhaps one of the reasons that this method has not gotten the attention it 
deserves is that it raises some rather difficult issues with regard to justification.  There 
is, first of all, a circularity worry.  Suppose I create an initial model, and then I study 
the deviations from this model.  These deviations are then taken to be evidence for, 
say, causal factors that must be taken account in the model.  I then add these further 
causal factors, and improve the model.  Perhaps I then investigate further deviations 
from the predictions of this new model, and try to make further improvements to the 
model.  If, however, the wrong initial model was used, then the deviations might not 
reflect any real causal factors after all—they might turn out to have been illusory, in 
which case the research program would have been going down a “garden path”.4  So 
one thing you would want to be careful about is that if a false model is being used to 
create new observations, the model ought to be false in the right way—the deviations 
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from the model ought to be ones which actually will tell us true things about the 
system, or at least point us in the right direction.  You would then expect that there 
might be some norms for models if they are being used in this way.  I will discuss 
such possible norms below.  I will now turn to a discussion of earth reference 
models—models that I believe are used in the way I have described.  
 
3.  Earth Reference Models 
The earth reference models that I have mentioned in this paper are idealized 
models of the mechanical properties of the earth’s interior.  If the interior of the earth 
is taken to be elastically isotropic, then the mechanical properties of each point in the 
earth’s interior can be characterized by three variables: density, and two parameters 
that express the elastic properties of the medium, usually incompressibility and 
rigidity.   If the earth is taken to be spherically symmetric, that is, mechanical 
properties of the earth are taken to depend only on the distance from the center of the 
earth, then the mechanical properties of the entire earth can be represented completely 
in terms of three functions of radius.  For such an idealized earth, expected travel 
times for various types of seismic waves can be calculated.  In the 1930’s, spherically 
symmetric models of the mechanical properties of the earth’s interior were 
determined by constructing idealized earth models and comparing expected travel 
times for such models with actual travel times of seismic waves.  There was a 
remarkable agreement between the earth models produced by the two main groups 
working on earth models at the time, one involving Harold Jeffreys and Keith Bullen, 
and the other involving Beno Gutenberg and Charles Richter (Bullen 1975).  The 
methods used here were hypothetico-deductive—that is, the models were postulated 
as hypotheses about the earth’s internal structure, and they were compared directly 
against observations of travel times.   
In the 1960’s, the fortuitous confluence of digital computing technology with 
a couple of the largest earthquakes ever recorded made possible the recording of 
normal modes of oscillation of the earth.  Normal mode frequencies can be calculated 
for an idealized, spherically symmetric earth, and models that incorporate normal 
mode frequency observations were built starting in the 1960’s.  Further, advances in 
computing allowed geophysicists to develop Monte Carlo methods in which earth 
models were generated randomly by computer and tested against observations (e.g., 
Press 1968).  Some of the models that agreed with observation were significantly 
different from the other models that had been postulated at the time, and these studies 
led to worries about the possibility of radically different models being consistent with 
observations.  Work by the geophysicists George Backus and Freeman Gilbert 
(Backus and Gilbert 1967, 1968, 1970), which tried to address this non-uniqueness 
problem, showed that limits could be put on the degree of non-uniqueness of earth 
models, but only under the assumption that the functions relating earth structure to 
observations of normal mode frequencies were linear, an assumption that was known 
to be false.     
According to the geophysicist Keith Bullen (1974), a committee was set up in 
1971 for the construction of a “Standard Earth Model”.  The reason given for the 
construction of this new model is that a large amount of new data had been collected 
since the Jeffreys-Bullen and Gutenberg-Richter models had been constructed, and 
individual geophysicists had been incorporating this new data in different ways.  This 
had led to a “great untidiness in the presentation of numerical seismological results”.  
In the mid-1970’s, several teams of geophysicists began to develop earth models with 
the goal of coming up with a standard reference model.  In 1981, this process 
culminated with the development of the Preliminary Reference Earth Model, which is 
still being used to this day, although there are now several other alternative models 
that are used as reference models as well.   
Earth reference models, such as PREM, are used in many ways, but what is 
most distinct about their use from an epistemological point of view is that they are 
best thought of in terms of functions 4 and 5 in the taxonomy of functions of idealized 
models described by Wimsatt.  They are used, that is, for detecting phenomena that 
would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen, or for estimating magnitudes 
of parameters that are not included in the model.   
These two uses can be seen quite clearly in the way in which PREM has been 
used for the construction of three-dimensional models of the interior of the earth, that 
is, models that are no longer simply spherically symmetric, but express the 
mechanical properties of the earth’s interior in terms of three spatial variables.  Most 
of these models are based on observations of travel times of seismic waves.  They are 
not, however, constructed by simply constructing a model and comparing it with 
actual travel times of seismic waves.  The observations used are usually travel time 
residuals—that is, the deviations from the travel times predicted by a reference model 
such as PREM.  The three-dimensional model constructed is then a linear perturbation 
of a one-dimensional reference model, such as PREM (Ritzwoller and Lavely 1995).  
Thus, the deviations between the observations predicted by PREM and actual 
observations are being used to identify three-dimensional features of the earth which 
are not in PREM itself, and to measure parameters that represent mechanical 
properties of such additional features.   
  
4.  Possible Norms for Reference Models 
 I now want to think about possible norms that might govern the use of 
reference models, keeping in mind Wimsatt’s functions 4 and 5: detecting phenomena 
that would otherwise be masked or be too small to be seen, or for estimating 
magnitudes of parameters that are not included in the model.  Reference models are 
being used to produce new observations through an analysis of the deviations of 
actual observations and predicted observations of the model.  These observations are 
then used to eventually arrive at a better picture of the earth’s interior.  In order to be 
useful in this process, the models are idealized—that is, they are false, but they must 
be false in the right way.  What is “false in the right way”, though?  There are, I think, 
two primary norms.  First, they must be simple in such a way that they can be utilized 
easily in this process of producing further observations.  Second, they must somehow 
reflect the physical situation, in such a way that deviations between what they predict 
and actual observations actually have some kind of physical significance.   
 Here is an example of how the first norm played into the development of 
PREM.  In the mid-1970’s, there were several teams of geophysicists working on 
different earth models towards the development of the standard reference model.  One 
such model was a “parametrically simple earth model” (Dziewonski, Hales and 
Lapwood 1975).  This spherically symmetric model represented the mechanical 
properties of the interior of the earth in terms of a piecewise continuous function, 
where most of the pieces were low-order polynomials.  There is, of course, no reason 
to think that the mechanical properties of the earth are truly distributed in accordance 
with low-order polynomial functions.  There are, however, advantages to this kind of 
representation.  For example, the “travel times of body waves and their derivatives 
would always vary smoothly as a function of distance on a particular branch of a 
travel time curve.”  (Dziewonski, Lapwood, and Hales 1975, 12)  As I mentioned 
above, one-dimensional reference models are often used for the construction of three-
dimensional earth models using travel time residuals as observations.  A model in 
which the predicted travel times varied smoothly as a function of distance would be 
easier to compute residuals for.  This would not only be useful for the construction of 
three-dimensional models, but also for other investigations that require the use of 
travel time residuals, such as the location of seismic sources.  Ultimately, the 
representation of large sections of the interior of the earth in terms of low-order 
polynomials was adopted into PREM (Dziewonski and Anderson 1981) as well.   
 The other norm is, I think, more complicated.  Reference models must be 
false, but they must be false in a physically meaningful way.  Often, what this means 
is that reference models will not be the best fit model empirically.  One of the 
geophysicists involved in the construction of PREM, Adam Dziewonski, discusses 
this consideration in a later paper which considers the possibility of constructing a 
new reference model:   
 
A reference model, in a modern sense, is one which satisfies more than just 
one class of seismological or geophysical observations—like, for instance, 
travel times of body waves.  It should constitute a common basis of reference 
for all the different studies concerning the earth.  […]  This strategy seeks a 
model which has to be physically meaningful—as opposed to an empirical 
one, which could achieve good results at reproducing a narrow range of 
observations rather than explaining them.  (Morelli and Dziewonski 1993, 
179) 
 
What is meant here by “physically meaningful” is that deviations from what the 
model predicts and what actual observations show give us useful information about 
the interior of the earth.   
Exactly what “physically meaningful” means could depend on the specific 
ways in which the reference model is being used.  For example, if the reference model 
is used in the construction of three-dimensional models of the earth, it would ideally 
correspond to the lowest order term in a spherical harmonic expansion of the normal 
modes of the earth.  Deviations from such a model would contain information about 
higher-order modes that would be indicative of finer three-dimensional structure.  
However, if a reference model is going to be used for many different purposes, a more 
general notion of “physically meaningful” might have to be used.  This is a 
complicated matter, on which further work needs to be done.  Here, however, I would 
like to point out the connections between the use of reference models and some recent 
work on scientific methodology.   
 
5.  Turning Data into Evidence 
 In this final section, I want to discuss connections between the way in which 
reference models are used in geophysics with some recent work on scientific 
inference by George Smith (2002)5 and William Harper (2011).  Both Smith and 
Harper have done extensive work on Newton, and they both emphasize the role of 
Newton’s Fourth Rule for Philosophizing in Newton’s methodology:   
 
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by 
induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make 
such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions.   
(Newton 1999, 796) 
 
The Fourth Rule of Reasoning says two things: that we should rule out hypotheses in 
favor of propositions that are gathered from phenomena, and that we should 
provisionally take such propositions to be either exactly or very nearly true. Smith 
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(2002) argues that Newton’s methodology involves taking such propositions gathered 
from phenomena to be provisionally true so that deviations between what you would 
expect the phenomena to be like, given that the propositions are true, and what the 
phenomena are actually observed to be like, can be found.  These deviations are then 
taken to be new phenomena that require explanation.  Both Smith and Harper refer to 
this process as “turning data into evidence”.  They both reject a simple hypothetico-
deductive picture where there is a hypothesis, and this hypothesis is supported (or 
rejected) by data.  Instead, certain propositions are needed in order to extract 
phenomena from raw data—to “turn data into evidence”.6 
 The parallel with the use of reference models is obvious.  Reference models 
play the role of propositions gathered from phenomena.  Expected observations for 
these reference models are calculated as if the reference models were true, and then 
deviations between these expected observations and actual observations are either 
taken to be indicative of further causal factors, or these deviations are used to try to 
measure further parameters that are not captured in these models.  Reference models 
are being used, in other words, to turn data into evidence.  “Turning data into 
evidence” is another term for what I have been calling active de-idealization.   
  If this is, indeed, an accurate picture of a significant way in which science is 
done, then it might be useful to think about the norms that govern this methodology.  
If one of the aims of building models—or, more generally, theorizing—is to enable 
active de-idealization, then we might expect the norms that are required here to be 
different from those that would govern a more standard picture where models or 
theories are constructed without active de-idealization in mind.  For example, there 
might be a norm for simplicity that is driven less by notions about the connection 
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between simplicity and truth, or by simple tractability considerations, and more by the 
fact that models that are simpler in certain ways can more easily be put to use in 
producing further observations.  There might also be a fairly complicated norm for 
“physical meaningfulness”—one that requires a model to yield deviations that would 
tell us something about a system or phenomenon of interest.   
 Now, one notable difference between Newton and earth modelers is that earth 
modelers already have fairly good ideas about what “physical meaningfulness” 
amounts to when building earth models, although they might not, by any means, have 
a complete picture.  On the other hand, the whole difficulty for Newton was coming 
up with a background theory that would allow him to differentiate between what is 
“physically meaningful” and what is not.  Thus, one might think that what I have to 
say here about reference models does not easily apply to the case of Newton.  On the 
contrary, however, I believe a detailed examination of the use of reference models 
could, itself, be a useful reference against which to compare the difficulties faced by 
Newton and others in various important episodes in the history of science.   
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